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Abstract: This paper estimates a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model in which agents use a Bayesian rule to 
learn about the state of monetary policy. Monetary policy follows a nominal interest rate rule that is subject to 
regime shifts. The following results are obtained. First, the author’s policy regime estimates are consistent with 
the popular view that policy was marked by a shift to a high-inflation regime in the early 1970s, which ended 
with Volcker’s stabilization policy at the beginning of the 1980s. Second, while Bayesian posterior odds favor 
the “full-information” version of the model in which agents know the policy regime, the fall of inflation and 
interest rates in the disinflation episode in the early 1980s is better captured by the delayed response of the 
“learning” specification. Third, the author examines the magnitude of the expectations-formation effect of 
monetary policy interventions in the “learning” specification by comparing impulse responses to a version of 
the model in which agents ignore the information contained in current and past monetary policy shocks about 
the likelihood of a regime shift. 
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 1 Introduction
The e®ects of monetary policy are closely linked to the expectation formation of
agents in the economy. Vector autoregressions (VAR) in the tradition of Sims (1980)
have emerged as a tool to assess the consequences of policy interventions. The
intervention is modelled as an unanticipated deviation { a policy shock { from the
perceived policy rule, and its consequences are evaluated through impulse response
functions. However, extended systematic deviations from the perceived policy rule
may lead agents to change their beliefs about the conduct of monetary policy and
invalidate the VAR impulse response predictions.
One method to overcome this problem is to estimate a fully-speci¯ed dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that can be re-solved for alternative
policy rules to predict e®ects of fundamental changes in the policy regime. However,
this approach faces some conceptual di±culties as well (e.g. Sims (1982) and Coo-
ley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984)). First, for several periods after the regime change
the agents are potentially uncertain whether the policy shift was temporary or per-
manent and the transition dynamics are possibly a®ected by the learning process.
Second, the extent to which past data can be used to validate the predictions is very
limited, since the policy change typically has no precedent.
In this paper we estimate a basic New Keynesian monetary DSGE model, along
the lines of King (2000), in which monetary policy follows a regime switching pro-
cess. Agents do take the possibility of regime shifts into account when they translate
observed monetary policy into expectations about future output, prices, and inter-
est rates. Unlike in the model considered in Sargent (1999), our regime switching
framework o®ers no explanation why monetary policy shifts occur over time. We
simply assume that there are high-in°ation and low-in°ation regimes and that the
transition probabilities stay constant. While ¯rms and households learn about the
conduct of monetary policy, the central bank itself does not attempt to learn about
the e®ectiveness of their policy and choose policy in an optimal manner.
We use a Bayesian approach that combines a prior distribution with the likeli-
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hood function derived from the structural model to obtain posterior estimates. Our
empirical analysis has three parts. First, together with the parameter estimates we
generate estimates of the monetary policy regimes in the post-war U.S. Our esti-
mates are consistent with the popular view that policy was marked by a shift to
a high-in°ation regime in the early 1970's which ended with Volcker's stabilization
policy at the beginning of the 1980's.
Second, we study the empirical evidence in favor of the learning mechanism. As
an alternative, we consider a version of the DSGE model in which agents have full
information about the current state of monetary policy. While Bayesian posterior
odds favor the `full-information' version of the model, the fall of in°ation and interest
rates in the disin°ation episode in the early 1980's is better captured by the delayed
response of the `learning' speci¯cation.
Third, we examine the magnitude of the expectations-formation e®ect of mon-
etary policy interventions in the `learning' speci¯cation by comparing impulse re-
sponses to a version of the model in which agents ignore the information contained
in current and past monetary policy shocks about the likelihood of a regime shift.
The likelihood-based estimation of a DSGE model with policy-regime shifts in
general leads to a very complicated non-linear ¯ltering problem that would take a
long time to solve on a conventional computer.1 We make two simpli¯cations. First,
we use a log-linear approximation of the DSGE model, and second we assume that
the policy rule depends only on observed variables, except for the regime indicator
and the policy shock, and not on latent model variables such as potential out-
put. We show that under these assumptions it is fairly straightforward to compute
the likelihood function of the regime switching model, using a modi¯cation of the
Kalman ¯lter. Methods described in Schorfheide (2000) are employed to evaluate
the posterior distributions.
Markov-switching models have been used by Sims (2000a) and Sims and Zha
1Substantial progress in this direction has been made by Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramirez (2002), who implement the likelihood-based estimation of a stochastic growth model with-
out using a log-linear approximation of the model solution.3
(2002) to study monetary policy. Sims (2000a) considers a univariate policy reaction
function that is subject to regime shifts, whereas Sims and Zha (2002) extend the
analysis to an identi¯ed VAR. While both papers ¯nd frequent oscillation between
regimes that indicate no fundamental shift of U.S. monetary policy in the post-war
period, our estimation uncovers essentially two distinct shifts of monetary policy.
DSGE models with shifting policy regimes have recently been analyzed by An-
dolfatto, Moran, and Hendry (2002), Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), and Erceg and
Levin (2001). The ¯rst two papers consider cash-in-advance models. Andolfatto,
Moran, and Hendry (2002) show that the agents' learning can explain the failure of
conventional tests of unbiasedness of in°ation expectations. Andolfatto and Gomme
(2003) use their model to study the Canadian disin°ation episode. Our ¯ndings with
respect to the e®ects of a disin°ation policy in the `learning' and `full-information'
environment, by and large, resemble the results reported by Andolfatto and Gomme
(2003). Erceg and Levin (2001) demonstrate that the `learning' mechanism is able
to generate in°ation persistence in a DSGE model with staggered nominal contracts.
However, none of these papers formally estimates the full DSGE model.
Leeper and Zha (2002) examine the important question to what extent monetary
policy interventions trigger signi¯cant expectation-formation e®ects. The authors
consider a simple two-equation model with an exogenous money-growth rate rule
that is subject to regime shifts and propose a measure of modesty of policy inter-
ventions. This measure can be computed from an identi¯ed VAR and, under certain
assumptions, provides an indication of the magnitude of the expectation-formation
e®ects. In the third part of our empirical analysis we directly study the magnitude of
the expectation formation based on our estimated DSGE model. We ¯nd that even
small interventions can trigger a substantial `learning' e®ect and lead to di®erent
predictions than the `full-information' version of the model. We o®er two explana-
tions. First, in a model with a feedback monetary policy rule `learning' a®ects the
contemporaneous impact of the policy shock. Second, small policy shocks are his-
torically associated with the low in°ation regime. Hence, Bayesian updating leads
agents to interpret a modest intervention as evidence for the low in°ation target4
and, vice versa, large interventions as evidence for the high in°ation regime.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary DSGE model
and its approximation. Section 3 describes the econometric approach and provides
some details about the computation of the likelihood function. Empirical results are
presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
We consider a monetary business cycle model with optimizing households and mo-
nopolistically competitive ¯rms that face price stickiness. The model is a variant of
the so-called New Keynesian IS-LM model. The main di®erence is that the monetary
policy rule is subject to regime shifts. To keep the paper self-contained we outline
the structure of the model. Detailed derivations can be found, for instance, Gal¶ ³
and Gertler (1999), King (2000), King and Wolman (1999), and Woodford (2000).
The main di®erence between the model presented below and the earlier work is that
the policy rule is subject to regime shifts.
2.1 The Firms
The production sector is described by a continuum of monopolistically competitive
¯rms each of which faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its di®erentiated







This demand function can be derived in the usual way from Dixit-Stiglitz prefer-






refer to the aggregate demand and price level, respectively: The parameter º is the
elasticity of substitution between two di®erentiated goods. As º ! 1 the demand
function becomes perfectly elastic and the di®erentiated goods become substitutes.5
Production is assumed to be linear in labor nt(j), which each ¯rm hires on a
competitive labor market:
Yt(j) = Atnt(j): (2)
Total factor productivity is an exogenous process that follows a random walk with
drift
lnAt = ° + lnAt¡1 + e zt; (3)
where e zt is an AR(1) process
e zt = ½ze zt¡1 + ²z;t:
The technology At induces a stochastic trend in the model economy. The autore-
gressive structure of e zt captures the observed serial correlation in output growth, as
the benchmark model lacks a sophisticated internal propagation mechanism.
To introduce nominal rigidity, we follow Calvo (1983) and assume that each
¯rm has a constant probability 1 ¡ ´ of being able to re-optimize its price Pt(j).
Whenever, ¯rms are not able to re-optimize they adjust their price from the previous

















subject to (1) and (2), where Wt+s is the wage, ¯ is the ¯xed discount factor, and
qt+s is a (potentially) time-dependent discount factor that ¯rms use to evaluate
future pro¯t streams. The ¯rms take aggregate demand and price level in (1) as
given. The aggregate price level is derived by noting that the fraction of ¯rms that
optimized its price s periods ago and charges the price P o













t )1¡º + ´(¼Pt¡1)1¡º
¸1=(1¡º)
:
De¯ne the in°ation rates ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 and ¼o
t = Po
t =Pt¡1 and divide (5) by Pt¡1 to
obtain the following law of motion for aggregate in°ation:
¼t =
·




2.2 The Representative Household
























where ¿ is the intertemporal substitution elasticity, Â is a scale factor, and ht+s
is hours worked. To ensure a balanced growth path, consumption in the utility
function is adjusted for the level of technology, which can be interpreted as an
aggregate habit stock.
The household supplies perfectly elastic labor services to the ¯rms period by
period for which it receives the real wage Wt. The household has access to a domestic
capital market where nominal government bonds Bt are traded that pay (gross)
interest Rt. Furthermore, it receives aggregate residual pro¯ts ¦t from the ¯rms
and has to pay lump-sum taxes Tt. Consequently, the household maximizes (7)

















The usual transversality condition on asset accumulation applies which rules out
Ponzi-schemes.
2.3 Fiscal Policy
The ¯scal authority follows a `passive' rule by endogenously adjusting the primary
surplus to changes in the government's outstanding liabilities. It is assumed that
the government levies a lump-sum tax (or subsidy) Tt=Pt to ¯nance any shortfall in










Gt denotes aggregate government purchases. We assume for simplicity that the
government consumes a fraction of each individual good: Gt(j) = ³tYt(j). De¯ne
gt = 1=(1 ¡ ³t). The aggregate demand can then be written in log-linear form as
lnYt = lnCt + lngt; (10)
where lngt is assumed to be an exogenous process of the form
lngt = (1 ¡ ½g)lng + ½g lngt¡1 + ²g;t: (11)
The process lngt can more generally be interpreted as a shift that a®ects the rela-
tionship between output and the marginal utility of consumption.
2.4 Monetary Policy
The central bank supplies money to the economy to control the nominal interest

















Here r denotes the steady-state real rate, ½ determines the degree of interest rate
smoothing, and Ã is the elasticity of the desired interest rate with respect to the
deviation of in°ation from its target ¼¤
t. The monetary policy shock ²¤
R;t captures
unanticipated deviations from the systematic component of the policy rule due to a
deliberate choice by the policy maker or an implementation error.
While in most of the literature the target rate ¼¤
t is assumed to be constant over
time and known to the public, we assume in this paper that it is stochastic from the
perspective of the public. Our model provides no explanation for the central bank's
choice of ¼¤
t. We assume that there are periods in time when the desired in°ation8
is high, ¼¤
t = ¼¤
H, and periods when it is low, ¼¤
t = ¼¤
L. More speci¯cally, the log







L if st = 1
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4 Á1 1 ¡ Á2
1 ¡ Á1 Á2
3
5;
where Áj is the transition probability I P[st = jjst¡1 = j]. The expected value of the
log target in°ation rate is
ln¼¤ =
1 ¡ Á2




2 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2
ln¼¤
H: (15)
Since it has been emphasized by some authors, e.g., Sims (2000a), that the variance
of the policy shock ²¤
R;t has changed over time, we let the standard deviation ¾R(st)
be a function of the regime. The state st is unobserved by the public and hence
agents have to learn from past in°ation and interest rates whether they are in a high
in°ation or low in°ation regime.
2.5 Detrending, Steady States, and Log-linear Approximation
To induce stationarity we detrend consumption, output, wages, and real money
balances by the level of technology, At. In terms of the detrended variables, the
model economy has a unique steady state. The system is in steady-state if the
shocks ²z;t, ²g;t, and ²¤
R;t are zero and there is no uncertainty about the in°ation
target, that is, ¼¤
L = ¼¤
H = ¼¤. It is straightforward to verify from the ¯rst-order
conditions of the optimization problems (4) and (7), not reported here, that the
steady-state relationships are given by
¼ = ¼¤; r =
e°
¯
















There is no trade-o® between output and in°ation in the steady state.9
De¯ne the deviations of output, in°ation, nominal interest rate, and government
spending from their respective steady states as
e yt = ln
Yt
yAt
; e ¼t = ln
¼t
¼
; e Rt = ln
Rt
R




A log-linear approximation of the market-clearing conditions and the ¯rst-order con-
ditions of the household's and ¯rms' problems leads to the following two equations:




I Et[e ¼t+1] + ·[e yt ¡ e gt]: (17)
Equation (16) is an intertemporal consumption Euler equation. The expectational
Phillips curve (17) is derived from the ¯rms' optimal price-setting decision and
governs in°ation dynamics around the steady state. The parameter · is a function
of the probability that ¯rms can re-optimize their price. In the absence of stickiness
kappa = 0. The term [e y ¡ e gt]=¿ corresponds to the marginal costs of production.
Since e gt in this model links output to the marginal utility of consumption it can be
broadly interpreted as preference shifter.
While (16) and (17) are standard components of New Keynesian models, we now
turn to the approximation of the policy rule. Our derivation follows the approach
in Andolfatto, Moran, and Hendry (2002). Divide (12) by the steady-state nominal





















e Rt = (1 ¡ ½R)Ãe ¼t + ½R e Rt¡1 + ²R;t; (18)
where the composite monetary policy shock ²R;t is de¯ned as





t=¼).2 The agents face a signal extraction problem, as they observe
the composite shock ²R;t at time t, but are uncertain about the target rate e ¼¤
t. They
2Equation (18) is less general than the speci¯cation in Sims (2000a) who also allows for time-
variation in ½R and Ã.10
will use a Bayesian learning rule to update their beliefs about e ¼¤
t. Equations (3),
(11), (14), (16) - (18), together with a learning rule for e ¼¤
t determine the evolution
of output, in°ation, and nominal interest rates.
Recent work on the stability of monetary policy reaction functions, e.g., Clarida,
Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (2000), has suggested that the elasticity of the interest rate target
with respect to in°ation deviations has changed at the beginning of the 1980's during
Paul Volcker's tenure as chairman of the Board of Governors. However, in a log-
linear approximation of R¤
t, the e®ect of a change in Ã is of smaller order than
the e®ect of a shift in the target in°ation rate ¼¤
t and therefore not explored in this
paper. Lubik and Schorfheide (2002) estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model based
on subsamples and allow for a simultaneous change in the target in°ation rate as
well as the elasticity Ã but without taking `learning' e®ects into account.
2.6 Model Solution
We have to solve the linear rational expectations system that consists of Equa-
tions (16) to (18), the law of motion for technology, government spending, and the
Markov process for the in°ation target. De¯ne the vector of relevant model variables
xt = [e yt;e ¼t; e Rt;I Et[e yt+1];I Et[e ¼t];yt¡1;e gt;e zt]0, the vector of exogenous shocks ²t(st) =
[²g;t;²z;t;²R;t(st)]0, and the vector of expectation errors ´t = [(e yt ¡ I Et¡1[e yt]);(e ¼t ¡
I Et¡1[e ¼t])]0, where the expectations are taken with respect to the information set of
the agents. The log-linearized model can be written as
¡0xt = ¡1xt¡1 + ª²t + ¦´t (19)
and has a solution of the form (see Sims (2000b)):





f £²I Et[²t+j]: (20)
While the shocks to the technology and government spending process are assumed
to be martingale di®erences, the composite technology shock ²R;t has non-zero con-
ditional expectations.11
Based on the model speci¯cation all information that agents have about the state
of monetary policy, st, is contained in the sequence of composite monetary policy
shocks ²t
R = f²R;1;:::;²R;tg. Let »t = [1;0]0 if st = 1 and »t = [0;1]0 otherwise.
Denote the estimate of »t based on time t information by
^ »tjt =
2
4 I P[st = 1j²t
R]




Future monetary policy regimes, »t+j, can be forecasted based on the Markov tran-
sition matrix P:
^ »t+jjt = Pj^ »tjt: (22)
Under the assumption that the monetary policy shock ²¤
R;t is normally distributed
with regime-dependent standard deviation ¾R(st) the regime conditional distribu-
tion of ²R;t+1 is
²R;t+1jst » N
µ




Once the new composite policy shock ²R;t+1 has been observed, beliefs about the
state of monetary policy can be updated using Bayes theorem. Let ³t be the 2 £ 1
vector that stacks the conditional densities p(²R;t+1jst = j), j = 1;2. Then
^ »t+1jt+1 =




where ¯ denotes element-by-element multiplication.
The conditional expectations of the composite shock are given by




Overall, the solution that takes into account the agents' learning about the state of
monetary policy has the structure






The solution can be computed recursively. It depends on st only through the com-
posite monetary policy shock ²R;t. However, the solution is a function of the entire
history of shocks. The term fl(²t
R) arises through the learning process of the agents.12
In our empirical analysis we will contrast the `learning' solution of the monetary
business cycle model with a `full-information' solution in which the current state of
monetary policy, st, is known by households and ¯rms. This knowledge could stem
from a credible announcement of the current policy regime by the central bank.
However, there is uncertainty about future states of monetary policy. In this case
the conditional expectations of the composite monetary policy shock are given by
I Et[²R;t+j] = (1 ¡ ½R)(1 ¡ Ã)[e ¼¤
L;e ¼¤
H]Pj»t (27)
and the law of motion of xt is of the form
xt = £1xt¡1 + £0²t(st) + ff(st): (28)
3 Econometric Approach
The model presented in the previous section is ¯tted to observations on output
growth, in°ation, and the nominal interest rate, stacked in the vector yt. The
observables yt can be expressed as a linear function of the model variables xt
yt = A0 + A1xt: (29)
Equations (14), (26) or (28), and (29) provide a state-space model for yt with regime
switching. We assume that the vector of shocks ²t has a normal distribution with
diagonal covariance matrix conditional on the regime st. The system matrix of this




where ¾g, ¾z, ¾R;L, ¾R;H are the standard deviations of the structural shocks. The
transition probabilities are stacked in the vector Á = [Á1;Á2]0, and the histories
of y¿, x¿, s¿, ¿ = 1;:::;t are denoted by Y t, Xt, and St, respectively. We will
place a prior distribution on the parameter vectors µ and Á and conduct Bayesian
inference, described in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 will focus on the computation of the
likelihood function for the state space model and our strategy to generate draws
from the posterior distribution of µ, Á and the history of latent states ST. The use
of posterior probabilities as a tool for model comparisons is discussed in Section 3.3.13
3.1 Posterior Inference
The analysis in the remainder of this paper is is conditional on an initial observation
y0. The latent state vector ST is treated in the same way as the parameter vectors
µ and Á. Once a prior distribution has been speci¯ed, Bayesian inference is concep-
tually straightforward. All the information about the parameters is summarized in





where p(Y Tjµ;Á;ST) is the likelihood function, p(STjÁ) is the prior for the latent
states { given by the Markov process (14), and p(Á;µ) is the prior for µ and Á. The




The practical di±culty is to characterize the posterior distribution. For the models
at hand, we will describe an algorithm that allows us to generate draws of µ, Á, and
ST from this posterior distribution.
In many Markov-switching models it is convenient to use a Gibbs-sampling ap-
proach and draw iteratively from the following conditional posterior distributions
(see Kim and Nelson (1999) for details):
p(STjµ;Á;Y T); p(Ájµ;ST;Y T); and p(µjÁ;ST;Y T);
because all three conditionals can be characterized in terms of well-known distribu-
tions that can be easily simulated.
For the model presented in the previous section, however, it is di±cult to gener-
ate draws from p(µjÁ;ST;Y T) due to the nonlinear relationship between µ and the
system matrices of the state space model. Hence, we factorize the joint posterior as
p(µ;Á;STjY T) = p(µ;ÁjY T)p(STjµ;Á;Y T) (32)
and use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm described in Schorfheide (2000) to gen-
erate draws from p(µ;ÁjY T). Conditional on the latent states we use Kim's (1994)14
smoothing algorithm to generate draws from the history ST of latent states. The
smoothing algorithm is exact for the `learning' speci¯cation and provides an approx-
imation in the case of the `full-information' speci¯cation.3
3.2 The Likelihood Function
To generate draws from the posterior distribution of µ and Á with the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm it is necessary to evaluate the likelihood function p(Y Tjµ;Á). In
linear Gaussian state space models without regime switching the likelihood func-
tion can be easily computed with the Kalman Filter (see, for instance, Hamilton
(1994)). The Kalman ¯lter tracks the means and variances of the following condi-
tional distributions recursively (for the sake of brevity µ and Á are omitted from the
conditioning set):
(i) Initialization: p(xtjY t).






(iii) Updating: p(xt+1jY t+1) = p(yt+1jxt+1;Y t)p(xt+1jY t)=p(yt+1jY t).





Unfortunately, the presence of a latent Markov state st complicates the computation
of the various conditional distributions. We will distinguish between the `learning'
and the `full-information' speci¯cation.
3.2.1 Learning Speci¯cation
The policy rule has a special structure that allows us to recover the composite
monetary policy shocks directly from the observables conditional on µ and Á:
²R;t(st) = lnRt ¡ ½R lnRt¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½R)Ã ln¼t (34)
¡(1 ¡ ½R)lnr ¡ (1 ¡ ½R)(1 ¡ Ã)ln¼¤:
3The accuracy of this approximation does not a®ect our inference with respect to µ and Á.15
Since xt in Equation (26) depends on st only through ²R;t, we can deduce that xt
provides no information about st conditional on the observables Y t. Thus, at the
initialization step of the ¯lter
p(st;xtjY t) = p(xtjY t)p(stjY t): (35)
De¯ne the vector ¸(µ) such that
¸0yt = lnRt ¡ ½R lnRt¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½R)Ã ln¼t (36)
= (1 ¡ ½R)lnr + (1 ¡ ½R)(1 ¡ Ã)ln¼¤ + ²R;t:
We factorize the distribution of yt+1 given Y t as
p(yt+1jY t) = p(¸0yt+1jY t)p(yt+1j¸0yt+1;Y t) (37)
and examine the two components separately. According to Equation (36) the history
of Xt provides no additional information about ¸0yt+1 conditional on Y t. Thus, it




p(¸0yt+1jst+1 = j;Y t)I P[st+1 = jjY t]; (38)
where I P[st+1 = jjY t] can be obtained from Equation (22). The beliefs about the
latent Markov state st+1 can be updated according to Equation (24), which yields
p(st+1jY t+1). Note that all the information in yt+1 with respect to st+1 is contained
through ²R;t+1 in the linear combination ¸0yt+1. To analyze the second term in (37)
recall that st+1 provides no information about xt+1 conditional on ¸0yt+1 and Y t.
Therefore, one can evaluate
p(yt+1j¸0yt+1;Y t) =
Z
p(yt+1j¸0yt+1;xt+1;Y t)p(xt+1j¸0yt+1;Y t)dxt+1 (39)
and
p(xt+1jY t+1) = p(yt+1j¸0yt+1;xt+1;Y t)p(xt+1j¸0yt+1;Y t)=p(yt+1jY t) (40)
using the standard formulas of the Kalman ¯lter.16
3.2.2 Full-Information Speci¯cation
The evaluation of the likelihood function for the `full-information' speci¯cation is
more complicated since the Markov state st enters the conditional distribution of xt
directly (see Equation 28). In this case, the distribution of xt given the trajectory
Y t is a mixture of 2t components and it is even for very small sample sizes com-
putationally cumbersome to keep track of all the mixture components. As noted
in the literature (see Kim and Nelson (1999) for a survey), the key to keeping the
¯lter operable is to collapse some of the mixture components at the end of each
iteration. We are using an algorithm that approximates p(xtjY t) by a mixture with
2k components.4 For each component and conditional on st+1 = 1 and st+1 = 2 the








p(yt+1jY t;st+1 = j)I P[st+1 = jjY t]




p(xt+1jY t+1;st+1 = j)I P[st+1 = jjY t+1]:
The updated distribution p(xt+1jY t+1) is a mixture with 2k+1 components, half
of which we eliminate. Components with approximately zero weight are removed
and pairs of components that are based on similar histories of st+1;:::;st¡k+2 are
aggregated into a single component with the same mean and variance.5
3.3 Posterior Model Probabilities
In the subsequent empirical analysis we are interested in comparing di®erent spec-
i¯cations of the model economy. We do this by computing posterior odds. The
4The results in Section 4 are based on k = 3. To assess the accuracy of the ¯xed-mixture
approximation we evaluated the likelihood function at the posterior mode for k ranging from 3 to
20. The log likelihood di®erentials were less than 0.01.
5Details of the algorithm are provided in a Technical Appendix that is available upon request.17












The ¯rst factor is the prior odds ratio in favor of M0. The second term is called
the Bayes factor and summarizes the sample evidence in favor of M0. The term
p(Y TjMi) is called Bayesian data density and given by Equation (31). The loga-
rithm of the marginal data density can be interpreted as maximized log-likelihood
function penalized for model dimensionality, see, for instance, Schwarz (1978). We
use a numerical technique known as modi¯ed harmonic mean estimation, proposed
by Geweke (1999), to approximate the data density.7
4 Empirical Analysis
The log-linearized monetary DSGE model described in Section 2 is ¯tted to quarterly
U.S. data on output growth, in°ation, and nominal interest rates from 1960:I to
1997:IV.8 The ¯rst step in the empirical analysis is the speci¯cation of a prior
distribution for the structural parameters. Table 1 provides information about the
distributional forms, means, and 90% con¯dence intervals. The model parameters
are assumed to be independent a priori. The target in°ation rates ¼¤
L and ¼¤
H,
the steady-state real interest rate r, and the standard deviations of the monetary
policy shock ¾R;L and ¾R;H are annualized. Since the solution of the linear rational
expectations model may be non-existent or exhibit multiple equilibria, we truncate
6According to Je®reys (1961) the posterior odds may be interpreted as follows: ¼0;T=¼1;T > 1
null hypothesis is supported; 1 > ¼0;T=¼1;T > 10
¡1=2 evidence against M0 but not worth more than
a bare mention; 10
¡1=2 > ¼0;T=¼1;T > 10
¡1 substantial evidence against M0; 10
¡1 > ¼0;T=¼1;T >
10
¡3=2 strong evidence against M0; 10
¡3=2 > ¼0;T=¼1;T > 10
¡2 very strong evidence against M0;
10
¡2 > ¼0;T=¼1;T decisive evidence against M0.
7We actually found that Geweke's (1999) approach is more stable than the procedure proposed
by Chib and Jeliazkov (2001).
8The time series are extracted from the DRI¢WEFA database. Output growth is log di®erence
of real per capita GDP (GDPQ), multiplied by 100 to convert into percent. In°ation is annual-
ized percentage change of CPI-U (PUNEW). Nominal interest rate is average Federal Funds Rate
(FYFF) in percent.18
the joint distribution at the boundary of the indeterminacy region.9 Our initial prior
assigns about 15% probability to indeterminacy. Mean and con¯dence intervals are
reported for the truncated version of the prior.
The prior con¯dence intervals for the parameters of the policy rule are fairly
wide. The elasticity of the nominal interest rate with respect to in°ation deviations
from the the target lies between 1.0 and 2.2, whereas the interval for the smoothing
coe±cient ½R ranges from 0.2 to 0.8. We identify regime st = 1 as the low in°ation
regime with target rate ¼¤






L range from 1.3 to 4.5 percent. The standard deviation
of the monetary policy shock is, in both regimes a priori between 25 and 100 basis
points. Our prior for the transition probabilities Á1 and Á2 implies that the duration
of the policy regimes lies between 6 and 50 quarters. The prior for the annualized
real interest rate is centered at 2 percent, which translates into a quarterly discount
factor ¯ of 0.995. The slope coe±cient in the Phillips curve, ·, is chosen to be
consistent with the range of values typically found in the New Keynesian literature
(see, for instance, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999)). The prior mean for the intertemporal
substitution elasticity is ¿ = 0:5.
4.1 Estimation of Parameters and Policy Regimes
We begin by estimating three speci¯cations of the monetary DSGE model: the
`learning' speci¯cation given in (26), the `full-information' speci¯cation (28), and a
version of the model without regime switching in the monetary policy rule for which
¼¤
H = ¼¤
L and ¾R;L = ¾R;H. Posterior means and con¯dence intervals are reported
in Table 2. We will focus our discussion on the estimated policy parameters.
Most striking is the estimated di®erence in the target in°ation rates: 4.8 percent
in the BL speci¯cation and 5.2 percent under full information. The estimated prob-
abilities of a regime shift are small, 5 percent or less, which means that the duration
9Lubik and Schorfheide (2002) estimate a version of the model without Markov switching based
on subsamples and allow for the possibility of indeterminacy and sunspot driven business cycle
°uctuations.19
of the regimes is more than 5 years. The Bayes factor reported in Table 3 clearly
favors the BL speci¯cation over the no-regime-shift version of the DSGE model.
To gain better insight in the evolution of monetary policy over time, we plot
the smoothed posterior probabilities of the high-in°ation-target regime in Figure 1
together with the NBER business cycle dates. The graph is consistent with the
view that policy makers in the late 1960's and early 1970's attempted to exploit a
Phillips curve relationship by raising the in°ation target in order to achieve lower
unemployment. The high in°ation episode ended with Volcker's stabilization in the
early 1980's after growing scepticism about an exploitable long-run trade-o® between
unemployment and in°ation.10 Of course, our analysis itself cannot rule out other
explanations of the shift in the target rate. The `learning' estimates suggests that the
Fed shifted to the high-in°ation regime during the 1970 recession , shortly lowered
the target between 1971 and 1973 and raised it again subsequently.
Our ¯ndings are in sharp contrast to the results reported in Sims (2000a) and
Sims and Zha (2002). Both papers examine the evolution of monetary policy with
autoregressive Markov-switching models. Sims (2000a) estimates a univariate reac-
tion function with regime-dependent coe±cients and ¯nds no evidence in favor of
two-time shifts in the early 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's. Instead, his esti-
mates, as well as the multivariate analysis in Sims and Zha (2002), suggest frequent
switching between regimes throughout the post-war period.
To understand the source of the discrepancy it is useful to consider the composite
monetary policy shock
²R;t = (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ Ã)~ ¼¤
t + ²¤
R;t:
According to the posterior mean estimates of the `learning' speci¯cation, the term of
²R;t that is due to the shifting in°ation target takes the value 0.33 with probability
0.63 and -0.55 with probability 0.37. Thus, its standard deviation is about 0.43,
which is smaller than the estimated standard deviation of ²¤
R;t. Based on a univariate
10Sargent (1999) o®ers two explanations for this scepticism: the `triumph of the natural rate
theory' and the `vindication of econometric policy evaluation'.20
estimation of the policy function it is very di±cult to detect shifts in ~ ¼¤
t.11 Hence,
the identi¯cation of the regimes comes e®ectively from the in°ation equation of
the DSGE model, not from the policy rule. Since the model does not imply time-
variation in the price-setting behavior of the ¯rms, nor allows for fundamental shifts
in the marginal cost process (except through output variation and the e gt process),
the observed rise in in°ation and the subsequent decline are attributed to two policy
regime shifts.
The estimates in Table 2 indicate that the high-in°ation-target regime coincides
with a high volatility of the monetary policy shock and more erratic behavior of
the Fed.12 To assess the importance of time-variation in the size of the disturbance
to the policy rule we re-estimate the `learning' and `full-information' speci¯cations
under the homoskedasticity restriction ¾R;L = ¾R;H. According to the posterior odds
reported in Table 3 the homoskedasticity restriction is rejected both under `learning'
and `full information'. In fact, the `learning' speci¯cation with homoskedastic policy
shocks is dominated by the version of the DSGE model that is not subject to regime
shifts.
A question that has received a lot of attention in the recent literature is whether
post-war monetary policy has been active or passive. A monetary policy is con-
sidered active if it involves strong enough eventual reaction of the interest rate to
the in°ation rate to guarantee a unique equilibrium. While the estimation method
used in this paper rules out regions of the parameter space that lead to equilibrium
indeterminacy it is nevertheless interesting to examine the estimates of Ã. Both in
the `learning' and `full-information' speci¯cation ^ Ã is about 1.7 and the con¯dence
interval is clearly bounded away from one. In the absence of regime switching, the
estimate of Ã is much closer to the indeterminacy region as the con¯dence inter-
val ranges from 1 to 1.3. In°ation enters the policy reaction function through the
term Ã ln(¼t=¼¤
t). The interpretation of the experience in the 1970's provided by
11In fact, a univariate estimate of the reaction function used in this paper leads to frequent rather
than two-time shifts.
12To some extent the policy shock might capture changes in the systematic part of monetary
policy that are omitted from our model.21
the no-regime-shift model is that the deviation from the in°ation target was large
while Ã was small. The regime switching estimates on the other hand, indicate that
the target in°ation rate was high in the 1970's and the observed interest rate move-
ments are not inconsistent with a Ã that is substantially larger than one.13 The
regime-switching model studied here ignores possible time variation in Ã. However,
the analysis in Lubik and Schorfheide (2002) does suggest that even after adjusting
for di®erent target in°ation rates through sample splitting there is evidence in favor
of passive monetary policy and equilibrium indeterminacy in the 1970's.
4.2 Evidence on the Importance of Learning
While in most monetary DSGE models it is assumed that the agents have full in-
formation about the state of monetary policy, the goal of this paper is to study the
e®ect of learning about policy regimes on the dynamics of output growth, in°ation,
and interest rates. Since we have ¯tted both the `learning' and `full-information'
speci¯cation to the data we can compare the two using the Bayes factor reported in
Table 3. Under the assumption that the two speci¯cations have equal prior proba-
bility, the Bayes factor implies that the posterior odds are 314 to 1 in favor of the
`full-information' speci¯cation. Thus, overall, incorporating the learning mechanism
into the model does not lead to an improvement of ¯t. However, Bayesian marginal
data densities and Bayes factors provide only a broad measure of model ¯t that cap-
tures one-step-ahead predictive performance.14 Hence, it is useful to take a closer
look at the dynamics generated by the learning mechanism.
We will study Volcker's disin°ation policy through the lens of the monetary
DSGE model. In addition to the `learning' and `full-information' speci¯cations we
also estimate a `no-learning' speci¯cation of the form
Xt = £1xt¡1 + £0²t(st) (42)






t¡1;M) the data density can be interpreted as predictive
score.22
in which the agents ignore the serial correlation in the composite shock ²R;t when
they form their expectations. The disin°ation corresponds to a shift from the high-
in°ation regime, sT¤ = 2, to the low-in°ation regime, sT¤+h = 1; h = 1;:::. Ac-
cording to our regime estimates the transition occurs between 1982:III and 1982:IV.
However, these estimates seem to capture the end rather than the beginning of the
disin°ation period. Hence, we choose T¤ to be 1980:I in the subsequent experiment.
For each model speci¯cation Mi we use the appropriate ¯lter described in Section 3
to compute p(xT¤jY T¤). For the BL model we also have to compute I P[sT¤ = 2jY T¤]
which is close to one by the beginning of 1980. We then set sT¤+1 = ::: = sT¤+12 = 1
(low in°ation target) and compute expected values for xT¤+1;:::;xT¤+12.15 The re-
sults are depicted in Figure 2.
Under the assumption that the disin°ation is announced by the Central Bank
and that the announcement is credible, the probability of the high-in°ation regime
drops from one to zero. If agents are Bayesian learners, skeptical about policy an-
nouncements, the belief about ¼¤
t change gradually. After two years the probability
of the high-in°ation regime has dropped to about 10 percent. In the `no-learning'
scenario agents' beliefs correspond to the estimated steady state regime probabil-
ities. The beliefs about the policy regimes are re°ected in the predicted path of
expected in°ation. Under `full information', expected in°ation drops rapidly from
12 to 5 percent, whereas under the assumption of `learning' the decay is sluggish
and expected in°ation stays above 7 percent until 1983.
According to the price setting equation current in°ation is an increasing func-
tion of expected in°ation. Hence, the drop in the latter is associated with a fall
of the in°ation rate. Under `full information' the nominal rate falls immediately,
whereas it rises initially under `learning'. The decay of the nominal interest rate is
delayed through the interest rate smoothing. Overall, the transition to low in°ation
and nominal interest rate is much quicker under full information. This result is
15Since the learning model is non-linear in ²R;t(st) we generate random draws of ²R;t and average
the trajectories of xt. For all three speci¯cations we average over µ and Á with respect to the
posterior distributions p(µ;ÁjY
T).23
consistent with the ¯ndings reported by Andolfatto and Gomme (2003). During the
disin°ation period the in°ation forecast bias is larger under `learning' than under
`full information', a point that has been emphasized by Andolfatto, Moran, and
Henry (2002). However, the bias is with less than 1 percent, fairly small in our
analysis. The `learning' version of the DSGE model predicts a rise of the ex-post
real interest from 4 percent in 1980:I to about 9 percent in 1980:III and a subsequent
decay. Under `full-information' the real rate drops almost monotonically, starting
from 9 percent in 1980:I.
Output growth is slightly negative in the ¯rst quarter of 1980 before it rises
to 1 percent in the second quarter. Under `learning' output growth starts to rise
immediately. It peaks in 1981 and falls to about 0.5 percent by 1983. Conditional
on information up to 1980:I our model predicts positive technology growth rates for
the subsequent quarters, which o®set the contractionary e®ect of the disin°ation
policy.
In the data the decline of in°ation and the nominal interest rate was indeed
sluggish. Figure 2 suggests that the updating of beliefs about current and future
monetary policy may have delayed the disin°ation. With the exception of a drop
in the third quarter of 1980, the ex-post real rate rises from about 2 percent in
1980:I to more than 10 percent in 1982:III and slowly falls afterwards. Thus, its
path vaguely resembles the hump-shaped response of the `learning' speci¯cation.
However, none of the DSGE model speci¯cations is able to predict the third quarter
drop of the interest rates. While the full-information version of the DSGE model
predicts a slight recession at the beginning of 1980, the actual drop in output growth
was much larger. Moreover, the assumed average output growth over the 12 periods
is smaller than the growth predicted by any of the speci¯cations.
4.3 Learning and Policy Interventions
The e®ects of monetary policy in dynamic models are often predicted with impulse
responses to monetary policy shocks, i.e., unanticipated deviations from the policy24
reaction function. However, if a policy intervention is sustained over a long period
in time, agents are likely to interpret the policy as a regime shift to a `new' policy
rule rather than a one-time deviation from the `old' policy rule and the intervention
generates an expectation-formation e®ect of the kind that Lucas (1976) emphasized.
The regime-switching model estimated in this paper allows us to quantitatively
assess the importance of this expectation-formation e®ect.
The subsequent analysis is closely related to work by Leeper and Zha (2002).
Leeper and Zha consider a calibrated two-equation model of output and money, in
which money evolves according to a no-feedback money growth rate that is subject
to Markov-switching. They model interventions through a sequence of policy shocks
and de¯ne the expectation-formation e®ect of a policy intervention as the di®erence
between the total e®ect and the e®ect under the assumption that agents know the
actual regime. In our setup the former corresponds to the responses in the `learn-
ing' speci¯cation, whereas the latter is equivalent to the `full-information' response.
Leeper and Zha argue based on their model that the expectation-formation e®ect is
likely to be small whenever the e®ect of the intervention lies within two standard
deviations of the policy e®ects that have been observed historically in a particular
regime. Such interventions are called modest. The authors use an identi¯ed VAR to
assess whether the interventions of the Federal Reserve Bank in the past have been
modest.
We will use our estimated DSGE model to calculate the magnitude of the
expectation-formation e®ect directly. We consider two types of interventions. The
¯rst intervention consists of a one-period interest increase of 25 basis points, the
second intervention raises the interest rate by 100 basis points for ¯ve consecutive
periods. To compute the responses we assume that the system is initially in the
steady state and then construct the sequence of policy shocks that leads to the
desired interest path. Formally, the responses are given by16
I E[ytjx0;fy3;¿gh
¿=1]; t = 1;:::;20:
16As before, we average over µ and Á with respect to the appropriate posterior distributions.25
Thus, we also integrate over st, with the following exception: to compute the re-
sponses for the full information speci¯cation in the second policy scenario, we as-
sume that the policy is accompanied by a period-by-period announcement of a low
in°ation target.
Figure 3 depicts the responses to the interventions for `learning', `full-information',
and `no-learning'. In the ¯rst experiment, the full-information and the `no-learning'
solutions di®er by the term £f(st) which has expected value zero. Hence, both
responses are identical. The most striking di®erence between the `learning' and the
`full-information' responses is the magnitude of the intervention e®ect on output
growth and in°ation. Consider the log-linearized reaction function:
e Rt = (1 ¡ ½R)Ãe ¼t + ½R e Rt¡1 + ²R;t
A positive policy shock ²R;t lowers the demand for money has the tendency to reduce
in°ation. Hence, the shock ²R;t has to exceed the desired nominal interest rate. In
the learning model a positive ²R;t leads agents to believe that the probability of the
low-in°ation-target regime has increased (to more than 75 percent). Thus, expected
in°ation drops and current falls further. The shock ²R;t associated with a one-
percent increase in interest rates is much larger under `learning'. This can be seen
in the fourth panel of Figure 3. The magnitude of the composite shock ²R;t can be
compared to the estimated standard deviations ¾R;L and ¾R;H given in Table 2.
The second column of Figure 3 depicts the e®ects of the second intervention. In
the `full-information' case, it is assumed that the agents associate the intervention
with a shift to the low-in°ation-target regime. The `learning' responses of output
and in°ation lie between the `full-information' and the `no-learning' response. The
disin°ation e®ect of the interest rate policy is strongest under 'full-information' and
weakest under `no-learning'. The two experiments suggest that ignoring the e®ect of
`learning' if it is indeed present can generate quantitatively misleading predictions
about the e®ect of a policy even if the intervention itself appears to be small and
short-lived.
A major di®erence between the model used by Leeper and Zha (2002) and the26
New Keynesian model in this paper is that current in°ation feeds back into the
policy rule and the `learning' e®ect £f(²t
R in Equation (26) is important for the
determination of the composite policy shock ²R;t. In other words, the presence
of learning e®ects the identi¯cation of the policy shock. Some of the di®erences
between the responses disappear if a more accurate identi¯cation is used for the
`no-learning' speci¯cation. We consider the following approximating model:
xt = £1xt¡1 + £0²t + £f(²R;t): (43)
This model has the property that it correctly predicts the initial e®ect @xt=@²R;t of
the policy shock but ignores the dependence of the `learning' e®ect on the entire past
history of shocks. Hence, the approximating model model provides a more accurate
identi¯cation of the policy shock ²R;t given xt and xt¡1 than the `no-learning' spec-
i¯cation. The responses for this approximating model are summarized in Figure 4.
The discrepancy between the output and in°ation responses is now much smaller and
the adjustment of the identi¯cation assumption to the presence of 'learning' leads
to more accurate predictions of the BL response with the approximating model.
Due to the heteroskedasticity of the monetary policy shock and the Bayesian
learning mechanism agents associate large shocks with the high-in°ation regime and,
vice-versa, small interventions with the low-in°ation regime. In Figure 5 we compare
the `learning' responses with responses that are calculated by setting ¾R;H = ¾R;L.
Consider the ¯rst experiment. Under heteroskedasticity the 25 basis point interven-
tion is interpreted as evidence of the low in°ation regime. Hence, upon impact of the
shock, the probability associated with the high-in°ation regime drops to about 20
percent. Under homoskedasticity this probability stays about 33 percent. Hence, the
predicted drops in in°ation and output growth is less severe and closer to the `full-
information' responses. In the second experiment the intervention is fairly large and
hence interpreted as evidence in favor of the high-in°ation regime. Consequently,
the probability associated with high in°ation is larger under heteroskedasticity than
under homoskedasticity.27
4.4 Robustness and Caveats
The posterior estimates of the persistence, ½g, of the e gt process reported in Table 2
is close to unity which suggests that the price-setting Equation (17) cannot en-
dogenously generate the persistence in the in°ation series. Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999)
propose a hybrid Phillips curve that involves lagged in°ation on the right-hand-
side. In the context of the model presented in Section 2, such an equation can be
derived from the assumption that a fraction ! of the ¯rms, that we are unable to
re-optimize their price, adjust their price charged in the previous period, Pt¡1(j),
by the lagged in°ation rate ¼t¡1 rather than the steady state in°ation rate ¼. The







I Et[e ¼t+1] +
·
1 + !e°=r
[e yt ¡ e gt]: (44)
It involves an additional parameter ! and nests Equation (17) as the special case
! = 0.
We place a di®use prior on the share !, that is centered at ! = 0:5 and estimate
the `learning' and the `full-information' version of the monetary DSGE model. The
posterior estimates of ! are around 0.2. A comparison of the two speci¯cations
based on the Bayes factor, see Table 3, indicates that the `full-information' version
is preferred. However, overall the introduction of backward looking price setting
does not lead to an improvement over the ! = 0 versions of the DSGE model.
Following Erceg and Levin (2001), we also consider a model in which the central













Under `learning' the posterior mean estimate of Ã2 in terms of annualized output
growth is 0.14, and under `full information' the estimate increases to 0.48. According
to the Bayes factor, the inclusion of output growth in the policy rule does not
improve the ¯t of the `learning' version. However, it does improve the ¯t of the `full-
information' version of the DSGE model. As before, the latter strictly dominates
the `learning' speci¯cation in terms of time series ¯t.28
The monetary DSGE models that have been estimated in this paper are very
stylized. Labor supply is inelastic and investment and capital accumulation, which
provide an important intertemporal link, are not modelled. Nevertheless, it has
become one of the benchmark monetary DSGE models in recent years. To provide
a reference for the overall ¯t of the model we also estimate a constant-coe±cient
VAR(1) with Minnesota prior.17 The data density, reported in Table 3 of the VAR is
orders of magnitude larger than the `learning' model, which documents the stylized
nature of the structural model. Nevertheless, we believe that some interesting lessons
have been learned from the empirical analysis presented in this section.
5 Conclusion
We have estimated a simple New Keynesian monetary DSGE model that has be-
come a popular benchmark model for the analysis of monetary policy. Unlike in
earlier econometric work, monetary policy follows a rule that is subject to regime
shifts. While our model provides no explanation why these regime shifts occur, we
assume that the public has potentially incomplete information about the state of
monetary policy and has to learn about the current regime. Our regime estimates
are consistent with the popular story that monetary policy is characterized by a
high-in°ation regime in the 1970's which ended with Volcker's stabilization policy
in the early 1980's.
The evidence on the importance of learning and uncertainty about the policy
regime is mixed. Posterior probabilities of the `full information' versus `learning'
speci¯cation of the DSGE model favor the former. On the other hand, a closer
look at the disin°ation episode in the early 1980's indicates that the fall of in°a-
tion and interest rates is better explained by the delayed response of the `learning'
speci¯cation.
The presence of a learning mechanism has potentially important consequences
for the prediction of the e®ects of policy interventions. A prolonged intervention
17The precise implementation is described in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2002).29
might be interpreted by the agents as a shift to a new policy regime and lead to
changes in the agents' expectation formation. We document these expectation for-
mation e®ects with our estimated DSGE models. Ignoring the e®ect of the expecta-
tion formation can result in misleading predictions even if the intervention appears
to be small, in particular if the predictions are generated from over-identi¯ed DSGE
models. The prediction errors can potentially be reduced if the response to the mon-
etary policy shock in the initial period is corrected to capture the contemporaneous
e®ect of the monetary policy shock more accurately. Our analysis also raises the
question whether agents associate large interventions with a shift back to a high
in°ation regime. If they do, then this can substantially alter the responses of out-
put growth and in°ation. Since many of the popular VAR identi¯cation schemes
impose fairly weak restrictions among the contemporaneous variables they may well
be consistent with the presence of a learning e®ect and deliver accurate predictions
as argued by Leeper and Zha (2002).30
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Table 1: Prior Distribution
Name Range Density Mean 90% Interval
° I R Normal 0.50 [-0.32, 1.33]
ln¼¤ I R+ Gamma 4.50 [ 2.43, 6.27]
ln¼¤
L I R+ Gamma 3.00 [ 1.35, 4.55]
ln¼¤
H=¼¤
L I R+ Gamma 3.00 [ 1.35, 4.55]
lnr I R+ Gamma 2.00 [ 0.47, 3.50]
¿ [0;1] Beta 0.50 [ 0.41, 0.58]
· I R+ Gamma 0.30 [ 0.13, 0.45]
Ã I R+ Gamma 1.62 [ 1.00, 2.22]
½g [0;1) Beta 0.80 [ 0.65, 0.96]
½z [0;1) Beta 0.30 [ 0.13, 0.46]
½R [0;1) Beta 0.50 [ 0.18, 0.83]
¾g I R+ InvGamma 1.25 [ 0.53, 1.99]
¾z I R+ InvGamma 1.25 [ 0.53, 1.99]
¾R;L I R+ InvGamma 0.63 [ 0.26, 1.00]
¾R;H I R+ InvGamma 0.63 [ 0.26, 1.00]
Á1 [0;1) Beta 0.90 [ 0.83, 0.98]
Á2 [0;1) Beta 0.90 [ 0.83, 0.98]
Notes: The Inverse Gamma priors are of the form p(¾jº;s) / ¾¡º¡1e¡ºs2=2¾2
, where
º = 4 and s equals 1, 1, 0.5, and 0.5, respectively. The prior is truncated at the
boundary of the determinacy region. Real interest rate r, target in°ation rates ¼¤
L,
¼¤
H, ¼¤ and the standard deviations of the policy shock ¾R;L and ¾R;H are annualized.34
Table 2: Parameter Estimation Results
No Switching Full Information Learning
Mean Conf. Interval Mean Conf Interval Mean Conf Interval
° 0.40 [ 0.26, 0.55] 0.39 [ 0.20, 0.59] 0.43 [ 0.23, 0.63]
ln¼¤
L 4.36 [ 3.62, 5.07] 2.83 [ 2.19, 3.49] 2.63 [ 1.87, 3.38]
ln¼¤
H=¼¤
L 5.21 [ 3.94, 6.53] 4.78 [ 3.21, 6.28]
lnr 2.10 [ 1.41, 2.82] 2.21 [ 1.68, 2.73] 2.20 [ 1.59, 2.82]
¿ 0.01 [ 0.00, 0.01] 0.40 [ 0.31, 0.48] 0.39 [ 0.30, 0.47]
· 0.37 [ 0.27, 0.47] 0.36 [ 0.26, 0.47] 0.37 [ 0.26, 0.47]
Ã 1.14 [ 1.00, 1.30] 1.68 [ 1.41, 1.96] 1.77 [ 1.32, 2.18]
½g 0.98 [ 0.97, 1.00] 0.99 [ 0.98, 1.00] 0.98 [ 0.97, 1.00]
½z 0.66 [ 0.62, 0.70] 0.78 [ 0.75, 0.82] 0.80 [ 0.76, 0.84]
½R 0.82 [ 0.78, 0.87] 0.75 [ 0.70, 0.79] 0.76 [ 0.71, 0.81]
¾g 1.20 [ 1.07, 1.32] 1.26 [ 1.13, 1.40] 1.25 [ 1.11, 1.39]
¾z 0.28 [ 0.24, 0.32] 0.29 [ 0.25, 0.33] 0.29 [ 0.25, 0.33]
¾R;L 0.99 [ 0.89, 1.08] 0.68 [ 0.59, 0.77] 0.62 [ 0.48, 0.74]
¾R;H 1.71 [ 1.39, 2.02] 1.57 [ 1.31, 1.82]
Á1 0.97 [ 0.96, 0.99] 0.96 [ 0.93, 0.99]
Á2 0.95 [ 0.93, 0.98] 0.95 [ 0.92, 0.99]
Notes: The table reports posterior means and 90 percent con¯dence intervals (in
brackets). The posterior summary statistics are calculated from the output of the
posterior simulator. Real interest rate r, target in°ation rates ¼¤
L, ¼¤
H, ¼¤ and the
standard deviations of the policy shock ¾R;L and ¾R;H are annualized.35
Table 3: Data Densities and Bayes Factors
Speci¯cation Log Data Density Bayes Factor
Learning (Benchmark) -806.80 1.00
Full Information -801.05 314
No Regime Switching -825.62 6E-9
Learning, ¾R;L = ¾R;H - 833.21 3E-12
Full Information, ¾R;L = ¾R;H -824.68 2E-08
Learning, hybrid Phillips Curve - 807.91 0.33
Full Information, hybrid Phillips Curve - 802.34 86.4
Learning, output growth and in°ation rule -807.05 0.78
Full Information, output growth and in°ation rule -782.06 5E10
VAR, Minnesota Prior -717.10 9E38
Notes: The table reports log data densities lnp(Y TjM) and Bayes factors relative
to the benchmark Bayesian learning speci¯cation. The Bayes factor of Mi versus
Mj can be obtained from exp[lnp(Y TjMi) ¡ lnp(Y TjMj)].36
Figure 1: Regime Probabilities
Notes: Figure depicts posterior expected value of the monetary policy regimes for
the `full-information' and the `learning' speci¯cation. As reference we also plot the
in°ation (solid line) and Federal Funds (doted line) rates.37
Figure 2: Disinflation Scenarios
Notes: Figure depicts posterior expected disin°ation trajectories for the full informa-
tion (solid line), learning (long dashes), no learning (dotted), speci¯cations together
with the actual values (short dashes) of output growth, in°ation, and interest rates.38
Figure 3: Effect of Policy Interventions
Notes: Figure depicts posterior mean responses: full information (solid line), learn-
ing (long dashes), no learning (dotted). Experiment 1: one-period intervention that
raises the interest rate by 25 basis points. Experiment 2: ¯ve-period intervention
that raises the interest rate by 100 basis points.39
Figure 4: Approximating the `Learning' Responses
Notes: Figure depicts posterior mean responses: learning (solid line), approximation
(long dashes), no learning (dotted). Experiment 1: one-period intervention that
raises the interest rate by 25 basis points. Experiment 2: ¯ve-period intervention
that raises the interest rate by 100 basis points.40
Figure 5: Effect of Regime-dependent Policy Shock Variances
Notes: Figure depicts posterior mean responses: learning under heteroskedastic
policy shocks (solid line), learning under homoskedastic policy shocks approximation
(long dashes). Experiment 1: one-period intervention that lowers the interest rate
by 25 basis points. Experiment 2: ¯ve-period intervention that lowers the interest
rate by 100 basis points.